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The Corporate Income Tax and the 
Competitiveness of U.S. Industries 
MICHAEL S. KNOLL* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. auto industry was hit hard by the financial crisis and reces-
sion that began in 2008. In 2009, it came to Washington, D.C., hat in 
hand, to ask Congress for a multi-billion dollar bailout.l Without that 
support, industry spokesmen said that one or more of the Big 3-Gen-
eral Motors (GM), Ford, and Chrysler-might not make it through 
2009.2 The industry received billions from Congress and they are still 
building and selling cars, although not as many as before the 
recession.3 
Many reasons have been given for the U.S. auto industry's lack of 
competitiveness, including the U.S. tax system, especially the high 
U.S. corporate income tax rate.4 In comparison with our trading part-
ners, the United States has a relatively high statutory corporate in-
come tax rate. Among the thirty members of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United 
* Theodore K. Warner Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Professor of 
Real Estate, Wharton School; Co-director, Center for Tax Law and Policy, University of 
Pennsylvania. I thank Edward Kleinbard for comments and suggestions and Alvin Dong 
and Benjamin Meltzer for assistance with the research. I have received no funding for this 
project from sources outside of the University of Pennsylvania and Columbia University 
(where I was a visiting professor during part of the time I was working on this Article). 
I Dee DePass, Manufacturers Step on the Brakes; Producers Say the Recession Has 
Knocked Their Wheels Off, and the Nearest Tow Is at Least a Year Away, Op.-Ed., Star 
Trib. (Minneapolis), Dec. 9, 2008, at 2D; Thomas H. Trimarco, The Big Three: When Will 
They Ever Learn?, The Boston Globe, Dec. 10, 2008, at A23. 
2 Ken Bensinger & Jim Puzzanghera, GM Raises the Stakes, Vows Cuts: The Carmaker 
Warns of Year-End Collapse as the Big 3 Submit Plans to Restructure and Seek Billions 
More from U.S., L.A. Times, Dec. 3, 2008, at A1; Sharon Silke Carty, Automakers Ask for 
Billions in Loans, Credit; 1\vo Say They're Nearly Out of Money, USA Today, Dec. 3, 
2008, at lB. 
3 See Bill Vlasic, Detroit Goes from Gloom to Economic Bright Spot, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
14, 2010, at A1; Nick Bunkley & Bill Vlasic, General Motors Files for an Initial Public 
Offering, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2010, at B1; David Shepardson, Obama Wants a Bank Tax 
to Recoup Funds, Detroit News, Jan. 15, 2010, at B6; Timothy F. Geithner, Op.-Ed., Wel-
come to the Recovery, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 2010, at A23. 
4 William McGurn, What's Good for GM Could Be Good for America, Wall St. J., Dec. 
2, 2008, at A17 (stating that taxes and health-care expenses make U.S. companies less 
competitive); see IRC § 11 (35% federal statutory corporate income tax rate on incomes 
over $18,333,333). 
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States has the second highest statutory corporate income tax rate after 
Japan.5 
Not surprisingly, business interests have long sought lower corpo-
rate tax rates, claiming that lower rates will improve U.S. competitive-
ness.6 Although the argument that the high U.S. corporate income tax 
rate hurts competitiveness resonates around the country and across 
party lines,7 there seems to have been little serious attention devoted 
to understanding the mechanism(s) through which the corporate in-
come tax reduces the competitiveness of U.S. corporations. 
The most likely explanation for such a gap is that economists (many 
of whom have studied the corporate income tax) generally eschew 
talk of competitiveness, because "competitiveness" is not a precisely 
defined term in economics.8 Yet, the public dialogue about taxes is 
filled with talk of competitiveness.9 My purpose in this Article is to 
bridge the gap between economic scholarship and public discourse by 
explaining how the corporate income tax affects competitiveness. Al-
though I use the U.S. auto industry as an example, the analysis and 
5 Tax Found., Tax Data: OECD Nations Continue Cutting Corporate Tax Rates While 
U.S. Stands Still: Federal Plus ProvinciaUState Corporate Tax Rates for OECD Countries, 
2007 and. 2008 (2008), http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/corptaxrates_oecd_change2007-
2008-20080813.pdf (including state and provincial taxes, the combined tax rate in Japan 
was 39.54% in 2008, whereas the combined tax rate in the United States is 39.25%). Al-
though U.S. corporate tax rates are high relative to the rest of the world, the corporate 
income tax accounts for an ever decreasing portion of federal revenues. For decades, cor-
porate tax revenues as a share of total tax revenues have been declining. See Budget of the 
United States, Historical Tables 32 (2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblbudget/fy2009/ 
pdUhist.pdf (Table 2.2-Percentage Composition of Receipts by Source: 1934-2013). Al-
though the top statutory U.S. corporate tax rate is 35%, the average tax rate (the total paid 
as a share of total income) is much lower, around 24%. See Ryan J. Donmoyer & Peter 
Cook, Rangel Plans Push to Cut Top Corporate Tax Rate to 28%, Bloomberg.com, Nov. 
15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid;,newsarchive&sid=AG71SuB.yyll. 
However, low effective tax rates combined with high marginal tax rates cannot be ideal 
because such taxes raise little revenue, but create large distortions. 
6 See Peggy Brewer Richman, The Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: An Eco-
nomic Analysis 4-10 (1963); Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Invest-
ment Income 119 (1969). 
7 In 2008, Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY), at the time the chairman of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, called for cutting the top corporate income tax rate from 35% to 
28% in order to improve the competitiveness of U.S. corporations. Donmoyer & Cook, 
note 5 (referring to a study by Ernst & Young that found U.S. corporations paid tax at an 
average effective rate of 23.7%). During the 2008 presidential campaign, candidate Barack 
Obama signaled his openness to such a reduction. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Steve Lohr, 
Looking for Swing Votes in the Boardroom, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 2008, at BUl. 
s See Samuel Brittan, "Competitiveness" Rears its Ugly Head, Fin. Times (London), 
Aug. 31, 2007, at 11 (discussing how politicians, business leaders, and even economists use 
the term "competitiveness" indiscriminately). 
9 See Edmund L. Andrews, Paulson Says U.S. Is Hurt by High Tax Rates, N.Y. Times, 
July 25, 2007, at C5; C. Fred Bergsten, Editorial, A Clear Route to Recovery: Exports, 
Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 2010, at A15; Newt Gingrich & Dan Varroney, Hoping for Change: 
Americans Still Need Jobs, Chi. Trib., July 13, 2010, at C15. 
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conclusions are general. They apply to other industries and even to 
other countries that have a classic corporate income tax.10 
This Article proceeds as follows.U I begin the next Part by describ-
ing what it means for an industry to be domestic and then I describe 
what it means for a domestic industry to be competitive. I show that 
there are two different definitions for the domestic industry in general 
use and that each definition is associated with a different notion of 
competitiveness. In Parts III and IV, I show that the mechanism 
through which the corporate income tax affects competitiveness dif-
fers depending upon how the domestic industry is defined. In Part V, 
I provide a diagrammatic representation of the results presented in 
Parts III and IV. Part VI concludes. 
II. DEFINING "CoMPETITIVENEss" AND "A DoMESTIC INDUSTRY" 
Competitiveness is an often used, but rarely defined term.12 It has 
been called a dangerous obsession13 and the hot-button issue in de-
bates over international tax policy,14 yet it lacks a clear and specific 
meaning. Competitiveness can mean different things to different peo-
ple and at different times. It also can apply at different levels of the 
economy. Competitiveness is sometimes said to be a characteristic of 
10 A classic corporate income tax is one where the corporate income tax is separate and 
apart from the individual income tax. In addition, although this is not always part of the 
definition of a classic corporate income tax, but it is important to generate the results 
described below, foreign corporate taxes do not generate foreign tax credits for the individ-
ual investors, who are the ultimate owners. 
11 This Article is part of a larger project on taxes and competitiveness. The first paper in 
that series is MichaelS. Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness (U. of Penn., Inst. for Law & 
Econ., Research Paper No. 06-28, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.cornfsol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=953074 [hereinafter Taxes and Competitiveness]. Other papers in these-
ries include: Michael S. Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest in the United States?, 82 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 703 (2009) [hereinafter Sovereign Wealth Funds]; Michael S. Knoll, The 
UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field or Tilting a Level One?, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 857 
(2007) [hereinafter UBIT]; Michael S. Knoll, International Competitiveness, Tax Incen-
tives, and a New Argument for Tax Sparing: Preventing Double Taxation by Crediting 
Implicit Taxes (U. of Penn., lnst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-21, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.cornfsol3/papers.efm?abstract_id=1259927 [hereinafter Tax 
Sparing]; Michael S. Knoll, Business Taxes and International Competitiveness: Under-
standing How Taxes Can Distort Ownership and Designing a Nondistortive International 
Tax System, in Dimensions of Competitiveness 207 (Paul De Grauwe, ed. 2010); Michael S. 
Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality (U. of Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ., 
Research Paper No. 09-16, 2009), available at http:l/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1407198 [hereinafter Reconsidering]. 
t2 See Paul Krugman, Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, Foreign Affairs, Mar.-
Apr. 1994, at 28. 
13 ld. 
14 Daniel N. Shaviro, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax 133 (2009). 
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firms, of industries, or even of entire countries.15 It has the most fa-
miliar ring when it applies to industries or sectors, as in the phrase 
"the competitiveness of the U.S. auto industry." Accordingly, 
throughout this Article, I use the term "competitiveness" as a charac-
teristic of a national industry. 
Before I talk further about "competitiveness," however, I discuss 
what it means for an industry to be a national industry. Politicians, the 
press, and commentators often speak of the "U.S. auto industry" with-
out being clear what they mean.16 There are at least two alternative 
definitions for the "U.S. auto industry." 
Under the most colloquial and frequently used sense of the term, 
the U.S. auto industry is the U.S.-based and U.S.-incorporated auto-
mobile companies-the Big 3. The operations of the Big 3 are not 
confined to the United States. They are multinational corporations 
(MNCs) with operations in many countriesP Under this definition, 
the U.S. auto industry comprises the global output of the Big 3 
automakers.18 
Under a second definition, the U.S. auto industry is the total pro-
duction of automobiles in the United States without regard to the na-
tionality of the producing company.l9 The U.S. auto industry, then, is 
the total output of automobiles in the United States by U.S.- and for-
eign-based automakers. 
Figure 1 illustrates these two definitions of the U.S. auto industry. 
The first definition (total auto production by U.S.-based automakers) 
15 For a thoughtful review of the literature on competitiveness with an emphasis on the 
wide range of different definitions employed in the literature, see Eckhard Siggel, Interna-
tional Competitiveness and Comparative Advantage: A Survey and a Proposal for Mea-
surement, 6 J. Indus. Competition & Trade 137, 140-48 (2006). 
16 See, e.g., Michael Brocker, German Makes Continue to Surge in U.S. Auto Market, 
Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 12, 2010, at COl; Michael Hiltzik, Dealers Need a Co-Signer: 
Congress, L.A. Times, July 16,2009, at Bl; Jerry Hirsch, Carmakers Ramping Up Ranks-
U.S. Auto Industry Expects Growth in Home Construction and, Therefore, Vehicle Sales, 
Chi. Trib., Jan. 19, 2010, at 19; Nelson D. Schwartz, World Leaders Wary of U.S. Economic 
Measures, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2009, at B6; David Shepardson, Obama Applauds U.S. Auto 
Industry, Detroit News, Aug. 6, 2010, at A17; Peter Whoriskey, At Detroit Auto Show, 
Washington Gets Close-Up Look at its Investment-Pelosi Applauds New Product Lines, 
Industry "Renaissance," Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 2010, at Al2. 
17 Although their overseas operations have been contracting, the Big 3 are all still 
MNCs. See Heather Timmons, In Overhaul, G.M. May Look to its Far-Flung Arms, N.Y. 
Times, June 4, 2009, at B4; Editorial, So Far So Good, N.Y. Times, May 18, 2009, at A22; 
Bill Vlasic, G.M. Is to Sell Hummer to a Chinese Company, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 2009, at 
B7. 
1s Many cars sold in the United States, whether they bear a U.S. or foreign nameplate, 
are made partly in the United States and partly abroad. Ashley Fantz, What Makes a Car 
American?, CNN.com, Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/12/american.cars/. 
19 See Robert B. Reich, Who Is Us? Harv. Bus. Rev. Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 53, 53-64. For 
a critique of Reich's analysis, see Laura D'Andrea TYson, They Are not Us: Why Ameri-
can Ownership Still Matters, Am. Prospect 37 (Winter 1991). 
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is given by the shade-d rectangle entitled Big 3 Auto Production. The 
second definition is represented by the rectangle entitled U.S. auto 
production and marked by hash marks. 
FIGURE 1 
Two DEFINITIONS oF THE U.S. AuTo INDUSTRY 
Non- U.S. 
Auto Production 
As is clear from Figure 1, there are two major differences between 
the two definitions of the U.S. auto industry. The first definition (to-
tal global production of U.S. automakers) includes the foreign produc-
tion of the Big 3 within the U.S. auto industry, which the second 
definition (total auto production in the United States by all 
automakers) excludes (the shaded rectangle and without hash marks). 
The second definition includes the U.S. production of foreign 
automakers, such as Toyota, BMW and Kia, within the scope of the 
U.S. auto industry, which the first definition excludes (the unshaded 
rectangle with hash marks).2o 
2o Foreign-based auto companies now produce more than half of the cars that Ameri-
cans buy, with many of those cars produced in whole or part within the United States. 
Editorial, America's Other Auto Industry, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 2008, at A22. Under the 
location-based definition of the U.S. auto industry, a car produced in part in the United 
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Neither definition of the U.S. auto industry is right or wrong. Both 
are plausible definitions of that industry and both definitions are in 
regular use.21 For the purpose of this Article, what is significant about 
the two definitions of the U.S. auto industry is that the impact of the 
corporate income tax on the competitiveness of the U.S. auto industry 
and the mechanism through which that effect occurs depends on how 
the U.S. auto industry is defined.22 
That brings us to the search for a definition for "competitiveness." 
A plausible broad working definition of competitiveness is as follows: 
An industry is competitive if it can attract large amounts of capital 
and labor at attractive rates and can combine that capital and labor 
efficiently into a product that it can (profitably?23) sell at the market 
price. Using such a broad definition, it is obvious that many factors go 
into making an industry competitive, including a well-educated and 
highly productive work force, access to advanced technology, a solid 
command of manufacturing techniques, a committed and efficient 
management, the ability to attract capital at low cost, good labor-man-
agement relations, and savvy marketing. Many of those factors, how-
ever, are either unrelated to or are only tangentially related to 
taxation. One factor that is directly affected by taxation is an indus-
try's ability to attract capital at favorable rates. Thus, in order to un-
derstand how the corporate income tax affects the competitiveness of 
the U.S. auto industry we need to answer the following narrower 
question: What effect does the corporate income tax have on the abil-
ity of the U.S. auto industry to raise capital? The answer to that ques-
tion depends in part on which definition of the U.S. auto industry is 
used.24 
Under the first definition, the U.S. auto industry is defined as the 
global operations of the Big 3 automakers. Viewed from such a per-
States and in part elsewhere is the product of more than one auto industry. In effect, the 
value added in each country is the output of each national industry. For expositional pur-
poses, I largely ignore complications that arise when automakers produce a car in two or 
more countries. I also ignore the role of independent suppliers. 
21 See id. 
22 The analysis and discussion that follow assume that the Big 3 would pay U.S. corpo-
rate income tax on any future income. These three companies have reported staggering 
losses over the years. See, e.g., Zachery Kouwe & Louise Story, Big Three's Troubles May 
Touch Financial Sector, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24,2008, at Bl; Matthew Dolan, John D. Stoll & 
Joshua Mitchell, Auto-Industry Crisis, Job Losses Test Obama, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 2008, at 
Al. Any income earned for many years would not be taxed until those loss carryforwards 
were used or expired. See IRC § 172. In effect, the Big 3 are tax-exempt. However, they 
might not have been viewed as effectively tax-exempt when they raised funds and made 
investments. 
23 See note 22. 
24 Thus, this Article does not look at how taxation can affect competitiveness through 
other routes, such as through the accumulation of knowledge or through the labor market. 
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spective, the U.S. auto industry competes with other national auto in-
dustries where each nation's industry is constituted by the automakers 
based in that country. Thus, the Japanese auto industry is the global 
production of Toyota, Nissan, Honda, and the other car companies 
based in Japan. Similarly, the German auto industry is the global pro-
duction of Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, and the other car companies 
based in Germany. Those industries compete with one another glob-
ally and locally. For example, U.S., Japanese, and German auto com-
panies compete with one another to produce and sell cars around the 
world and in specific markets, including the United States. Thus, the 
first definition of a domestic industry focuses on ownership. Under 
that definition, the U.S. auto industry comprises all of the productive 
assets owned by U.S.-based auto companies whether in the United 
States or elsewhere.25 
Because the first definition of the U.S. auto industry focuses on the 
nationality of the company that sells the car, not where the car is pro-
duced, the competition between U.S., Japanese, and German auto 
companies can be visualized as competition to acquire control over 
productive assets located in different locations.26 Under this view, the 
various national auto industries compete, for example, to own an auto 
plant in Canada. Viewed from such a perspective, a national industry 
is more competitive than its rivals if it acquires the Canadian plant. 
Taxation, then, affects competitiveness through its impact on the own-
ership of productive assetsP Thus, the U.S. corporate income tax will 
adversely affect the competitiveness of the U.S. automotive industry if 
it reduces the incentive for the Big 3-relative to their foreign com-
petitors-to own automobile-producing assets.28 If the corporate in-
come tax discourages U.S. firms from owning automotive assets, then 
25 The implicit assumption that a company has a nationality that can be identified is not 
without controversy. See note 31. 
26 Competition over where cars are produced falls under the second definition. 
n See Knoll, Sovereign Wealth Funds, note 11, at 7-9. 
28 Viewed from such a perspective, competitiveness bears a familiarity to the notion of 
capital ownership neutrality, which is closely associated with the work of Mihir Desai and 
James Hines. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Evaluating International Tax 
Reform, 56 Nat'l Tax J. 487 (2003); Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Old Rules and 
New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 Nat'l Tax J. 937 (2004); Mihir 
A. Desai, New Foundations for Taxing Multinational Corporations, 82 Taxes, Mar. 2004, at 
39. The term capital ownership neutrality was coined by Michael Devereux in an unpub-
lished working paper. See Michael P. Devereux, Capital Export Neutrality, Capital Import 
Neutrality, Capital Ownership Neutrality, and All That (Inst. for Fisc. Stud. 1990)(unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the author). It is also similar to the notion of capital import 
neutrality as originally described by Peggy Musgrave. See Richman, note 6, at 8; Mus-
grave, note 6, at 119. For the argument that capital import neutrality has been and still 
regularly is used in two inconsistent ways, one of which is closely related to capital owner-
ship neutrality, see Knoll, Reconsidering, note 11. 
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the corporate income tax directly reduces the competitiveness of the 
U.S. auto industry; otherwise, it does not. 
Under the second definition, the U.S. auto industry is defined as the 
production of automobiles within the United States without regard to 
the nationality of the producing firms. The U.S. auto industry, then, 
includes the domestic production of the Big 3 as well as the U.S. pro-
duction of foreign automobile makes and models. Viewed from such 
a perspective, the U.S. auto industry competes with foreign auto in-
dustries where each national industry is defined by the auto produc-
tion occurring within that country regardless of the nation in which 
the firms that conduct those activities are based. For example, the 
German auto industry comprises the production of cars in Germany, 
including the domestic production of German car companies and the 
German production of non-German nameplates, including that of the 
Big 3 and the Japanese carmakers. Thus, the second definition of a 
domestic industry focuses on the location of assets. Under that defini-
tion, the U.S. auto industry comprises all automobile-producing assets 
located in the United States. 
Viewed from this perspective, the competition that takes place be-
tween the U.S., German, and Japanese auto industries takes the form 
of competition to produce more cars within each country. Because 
auto production is a highly capital-intensive activity, that competition 
takes the form of competing to attract capital.29 The corporate in-
come tax, then, affects competition through its impact on investment 
in auto production in different countries.30 Thus, the U.S. corporate 
income tax reduces the competitiveness of the U.S. automobile indus-
try if it discourages investment in automobile production in the 
United States relative to investment in such production abroad. If the 
U.S. corporate income tax discourages production in the United 
States, then it directly reduces the competitiveness of the U.S. auto 
industry; otherwise, it does not. 
In the next two Parts, I examine the impact of the corporate income 
tax on the U.S. auto industry under the two different notions of the 
competitiveness of the industry described above. For each definition 
of the U.S. auto industry, I describe how the corporate income tax 
directly affects competitiveness. In each case, I describe the mechan-
ics through which that effect occurs and under what circumstances it 
occurs. 
29 The competition for capital is usually visualized as being for private capital, not gov-
ernment financing. Government financing at nonmarket terms is appropriately excluded 
from the analysis because it is at most tangentially connected to the corporate income tax. 
30 Viewed from such a perspective, competitiveness is similar to the notion of capital 
export neutrality. See Knoll, Reconsidering, note 11, at 16-20. 
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III. TAXES AND CoMPETITIVENEss OF DoMESTICALLY-BASED MNCs 
In the last Part, I described two alternative ways of defining a do-
mestic industry-the global production of domestically-based produc-
ers31 and the domestic production of all producers regardless of where 
they are based. In that Part, I also described the link between the 
corporate income tax and the competitiveness of the domestic indus-
try under each definition. Under the first definition, the corporate 
income tax hurts competitiveness if it discourages investment by do-
mestically-based firms relative to foreign-based firms. Thus, the first 
definition focuses on the ownership of assets. Under the second defi-
nition, the corporate income tax hurts competitiveness if it discour-
ages investment in the taxing country relative to investment abroad. 
Thus, the second definition focuses on the location of investment. In 
this Part, I assess the impact of the corporate income tax on the own-
ership of automotive assets by domestically-based and foreign-based 
corporations. In the next Part, I look at the impact of the corporate 
income tax on the location of that investment. 
Under the first definition, the U.S. auto industry comprises the 
global production of U.S.-based automakers-the Big 3. Taxation af-
fects the competitiveness of that industry by influencing whether the 
U.S. auto industry or its foreign rivals own specific assets. The impact 
of taxation on the ownership of assets depends upon whether the com-
petition is among entities that raise the capital they invest from inves-
tors or among investors who invest their own capital. When the 
competition takes place among investors, each investor compares the 
after-tax rate of return on alternative investments to the after-tax rate 
of return on the investment under consideration.32 An investor is at a 
31 In which jurisdiction a firm is based is not always an easy question to answer unam-
biguously. Under U.S. tax rules, a corporation's home is the state where it is incorporated. 
IRC § 7701(a)(4), (5). Many other countries use a facts-and-circumstances approach to 
determine a corporation's home for tax purposes. Such an approach makes tax planning 
more difficult, and it does not always yield clear answers. See generally Mitchell Kane & 
Edward Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition, 106 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1229 (2008). 
32 One way to view the difference between entities and investors is that entities special-
ize in their investments whereas investors tend to hold diversified portfolios so as to reduce 
risk. Accordingly, when assets are differentially taxed, investors trade off risk and return. 
The after-tax capital asset pricing model (CAPM) describes how differential taxes across 
assets and investors affect portfolio choices. The after-tax CAPM was first described by 
Michael Brennan. M.J. Brennan, Taxes, Market Valuation and Corporate Financial Policy, 
23 Nat'! Tax J. 417 (1970). It was subsequently expanded and applied by, among others, 
David Bradford, Roger Gordon, David Guenther, and Richard Sansing. Roger H. Gordon 
& David F. Bradford, Taxation and the Stock Market Valuation of Capital Gains and Divi-
dends, 14 J. Pub. Econ. 109 (1980); David A. Guenther & Richard Sansing, The Effect of 
Tax-Exempt Investors and Risk on Stock Ownership and Expected Returns (2008) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the author). It was first used to study international tax 
policy by Mihir Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika 
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tax-induced disadvantage only when the ratio of the investor's after-
tax rate of return for the investment under consideration to the same 
investor's after-tax rate of return on alternative investments is below 
that same ratio for competing investors. It thus follows, that an inves-
tor is not at a tax-induced disadvantage in the competition to acquire 
a specific asset simply because that investor is taxed more haevily than 
his competitors on the income from that asset. Instead, the first inves-
tor is only at a tax disadvantage if he is taxed more heavily than his 
rivals on the investment relative to alternative investments (com-
monly called the benchmark asset or benchmark portfolio ).33 
When, however, the competition takes place among entities that 
raise capital to invest-as opposed to investors who allocate their own 
investment capital-tax considerations favor investing through the 
lowest-taxed entity.34 When an investment is made through a highly-
taxed entity, a higher tax burden is imposed on that investment than 
when the investment is made through a lightly-taxed entity. That is to 
say, when the competition is among entities, absolute levels of taxa-
tion determine which entity has a tax-induced advantage in competi-
tiveness. (In contrast, when the competition is across investors, 
relative levels of taxation determine who has a tax-induced advan-
tage.) Thus, the competition among corporations to acquire assets de-
pends upon absolute as opposed to relative tax rates. 
From a tax perspective, what distinguishes corporations from other 
investment entities is that corporations are taxed separately from their 
investors.35 The corporate income tax is assessed on the corporation's 
income and the liability is paid out of corporate assets. Corporate 
income is not included on the investor's return and corporate taxes 
are not considered to be paid by the individual investor.36 Accord-
ingly, because corporations are separ-ately taxed entities, the corpo-
Dharmapala, Investor Taxation in Open Economies (2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download& 
file_id=162914 (last visited Sept. 14, 2010). I subsequently applied the after-tax CAPM to 
examine how tax policy affects the competition between sovereign wealth funds and pri-
vate investors for different investments. Knoll, Sovereign Wealth Funds, note 11, at 7-17. 
33 I make this argument in Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness, note 11, at 12-17, and 
apply it in Knoll, UBIT, note 11, at 6-12, and Knoll, Sovereign Wealth Funds, note 11, at 7-
9. 
34 When the entity is taxed, but the income earned and the taxes paid by the entity are 
attributable to the investor or are creditable as with the indirect foreign tax credit, IRC 
§§ 902, 960, then the entity is effectively an untaxed pass-through entity for tax purposes. 
35 In the tax literature, this is referred to as a classic corporate income tax. Corporate 
income is taxed twice: once at the level of the individual and then again at the level of the 
investor. IRC §§ 1, 11, 61. 
36 Some jurisdictions integrate the corporate and individual taxes. There are two basic 
ways to do this. If the investor is exempt, tax is assessed at the corporate leveL If the 
investors receive a tax credit for the tax paid by the corporation, then the tax is effectively 
assessed at the investor leveL 
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rate income tax operates as a toll charge on investments made through 
corporations.37 Thus, when the toll charge differs across companies 
(because tax rates differ), the corporate income tax affects competi-
tiveness. Companies that pay a higher effective corporate income tax 
rate than their competitors are at a tax-induced disadvantage in com-
petitiveness, and conversely. In effect, the higher tax rate raises the 
company's hurdle rate on new investments. That is because the 
before-tax return on the investment pays both the corporate tax and 
the investor, who presumably requires the same after-tax return re-
gardless of the entity through which the investment is made. Thus, a 
higher corporate tax burden directly translates into a higher hurdle 
rate for investments. 
As a result, the effect of the corporate income tax on competitive-
ness depends upon where income arises.38 For investments that pro-
duce income in the United States, the U.S. corporate income tax is 
assessed on that income whether the parent corporation is a U.S. or a 
foreign corporation.39 Thus, when it comes to acquiring productive 
assets in the United States, the U.S. corporate income tax does not 
disadvantage U.S.-based firms relative to their foreign-based rivals.40 
That is so even when the U.S. corporate income tax rate exceeds for-
eign rates. 
For investments that produce income outside of the United States, 
however, the U.S. corporate income tax disadvantages U.S.-based cor-
porations relative to their foreign-based counterparts.41 Because the 
United States taxes U.S.-based corporations on their worldwide in-
come, U.S. corporations pay U.S. tax on their foreign source income.42 
37 I make this argument in Knoll, Business Taxes, note 11, at 11-12, and Knoll, Taxes and 
Competitiveness, note 11, at 18-19. A similar argument is made by Devereux, note 28. 
38 There are elaborate and complex source rules that determine what jurisdiction has the 
primary right to tax a given income stream. 
39 IRC § 11, 881(a), 882(a). 
40 The discussion in the text ignores any difference in the ability of U.S.-based and for-
eign-based companies to set internal transfer prices in a manner that reduces taxes. For an 
introduction to transfer pricing, see Brian J. Arnold & Michael J. Mcintyre, International 
Tax Primer ch. 4 (2d ed. 2002). 
41 Foreign and domestic investments are widely assumed to be substitutes. There is, 
however, some evidence that they are complements. See Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & 
James R. Hines, Jr., Domestic Effects of the Foreign Activities of US Multinationals 5 
(Div. of Research, Harvard Bus. School, Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www. 
people.hbs.edu/ffoley/fdidomestic.pdf. That is to say, more efficient firms invest more eve-
rywhere. If that is right, the U.S. reliance on a worldwide corporate income tax will disad-
vantage U.S. firms not only with respect to their foreign investments, but also will 
disadvantage them with respect to their domestic investments. 
42 IRC § 11 (not limiting taxable corporate income to U.S. source income). Although 
the United States is often said to come closer to a pure worldwide tax system than almost 
any other country, the U.S. tax system falls short of that ideal by not having an unlimited 
foreign tax credit and by deferring taxation on some classes of foreign income. 
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To avoid double taxation, U.S. taxpayers receive a foreign tax credit 
(FTC) for taxes ·paid to foreign governments on their U.S. source in-
come.43 That credit, however, is limited to the U.S. tax that would 
have been paid on that income.44 Thus, when it comes to making in-
vestments in overseas assets, the U.S. corporate income tax imposes 
an additional or incremental tax.45 That tax disadvantages U.S. corpo-
rations relative to foreign corporations that do not pay any additional 
tax on their foreign source income.46 
In general, the disadvantage that a U.S.-based corporation faces 
abroad is greater the lower the tax rate imposed by the host jurisdic-
tion relative to the rate imposed by the United States.47 Thus, the 
disadvantage is likely to be large when the host jurisdiction uses tax 
incentives to attract foreign investment. When offered to U.S.-based 
corporations, such incentives ultimately will end up in the U.S. trea-
sury. In contrast, when offered to foreign-based corporations that are 
not taxed on a worldwide basis, those tax incentives will likely re-
d~mnd to the benefit of the recipient firms.48 
As suggested immediately above, the disadvantage U.S.-based 
MNCs face in the competition to acquire foreign assets is not inherent 
in the corporate income tax. Instead, the disadvantage is a result of 
the United States taxing the worldwide income of U.S.-based corpora-
tions. Many countries do not tax their domestic corporations' world-
wide income, choosing instead to tax only the income earned within 
the jurisdiction. Jurisdictions that do not tax the foreign source in-
come of their residents and domestically-based corporations are said 
to employ a source-based or a territorial tax system. It follows that if 
the United States were to adopt a territorial tax system and stop tax-
43 IRC § 901. 
44 IRC § 904. 
45 Under some circumstances, U.S.-based corporations will have an advantage in the 
competition to acquire foreign assets. Specifically, when the U.S. corporate tax rate is 
below the foreign corporate tax rate and the foreign taxes are fully creditable in the United 
States, then U.S.-based finns will value the assets more highly than domestic frrms. In 
effect, the toll charge bas become a subsidy. See J. Clifton Heming, Jr. , Robert J. Peroni & 
Stephen E. Shay, Some Perspectives from the United States on the Worldwide Taxation vs. 
Territorial Taxation Debate, 3 J. of Australasian Teachers Assn. 35, 35-36 (2008), available 
at http://www.atax.unsw.edu.au/atta/jatta/jattavol3no2/l_jatta_vol3_no2.pdf. 
46 Deferral reduces but does not eliminate that disadvantage. Moreover, because of the 
possibility of using FfCs earned in one country to offset tax on the income earned in 
another country, it therefore follows that for any specific investment the U.S. corporation 
might have either an advantage or disadvantage relative to foreign competitors. It is, how-
ever, likely because the United States collects revenue on foreign source income that on 
average U.S. corporations are disadvantaged by the corporate income tax. Moreover, the 
enactment of any proposals that would reduce deferral would reduce the competitiveness 
of U.S.-based MNCs abroad. 
47 See Knoll, Tax Sparing, note 11, at 11-17. 
48 Id. at 9. 
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ing the foreign source income of U.S. corporations, it could eliminate 
the disadvantage described above. In such circumstances, the U.S. 
corporate income tax would no longer operate as a toll charge on U.S. 
corporations investing abroad.49 
The United States does not have to go as far as adopting a pure 
territorial tax system in order to eliminate the disadvantage faced by 
U.S. corporations. No country uses either a pure worldwide or a pure 
territorial tax system; most countries use hybrid tax systems that com-
bine elements of both systems.50 Many countries employ a hybrid that 
taxes active income on a territorial basis and passive income on a 
worldwide or residence basis. In practice, such an approach often re-
sults in taxing corporate income at source and individual income at 
the investor's residence.51 Accordingly, if the United States were to 
adopt such a hybrid, the U.S. corporate income tax would not operate 
as a toll charge on foreign source income and U.S.-based corporations 
would not be disadvantaged when investing overseas.52 
The Obama Administration, however, is not trying to move the U.S. 
international tax system into closer alignment with those of our major 
trading partners. Instead, the Administration says that it wants to 
tighten worldwide taxation by reducing deferral, which would move 
our international tax system further away from those of our trading 
partners.53 If enacted and enforced, such a policy would increase the 
toll charge from making overseas investments through U.S. compa-
49 Fleming et a!., note 45, at 36-37. The logic for taxing passive income on a residence 
basis is that such income has no clear source and can easily be made to seem to have 
whatever source is desired. Accordingly, most countries with territorial tax systems tax 
passive income on a residence basis. See Hugh J. Ault & Brian J. Arnold, Comparative 
Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 372-75, 378 (2d ed. 2004); Fleming et al., note 45, 
at 85. 
50 Fleming et al., note 45, at 36-37. 
51 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law 11-13 (2007). 
52 See Knoll, Business Taxes, note 11, at 18-19. The analysis is different and simpler 
when the entity is not taxed, but is instead treated as a pass-through entity. (An entity can 
be a pass-through because the entity is not taxed or because the investor includes entity 
income on his personal return and treats the entity's tax liability as a tax payment on his 
own behalf. In the United States, partnerships, limited liability companies (LLCs), and S 
corporations are examples of the first type of pass-through. The indirect FTC, which in the 
United States only applies when a U.S. corporation owns at least 10% of the stock of a 
foreign corporation from which it has received a dividend, is an example of the second.) 
See IRC § 701, 902(a), 1363(a); Reg. § 301.7701-Z(c), -3(b). In that case, the individual 
investor's tax rate is the only relevant tax rate. Moreover, differences in relative tax rates 
do not distort ownership as long as tax rates are equal across investments. 
53 See Robert Carroll, The Importance of Tax Deferral and a Lower Corporate Tax Rate 
(Tax Found., Spec. Rep. No. 174, Feb. 2010), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/ 
files/sr174.pdf. 
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nies, thereby further reducing the competitiveness of U.S.-incorpo-
rated MNCs.54 
IV. TAXES AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION 
The corporate income tax also affects competitiveness when the do-
mestic industry is defined by the productive activity located within 
that nation. Under the second definition of a domestic industry, the 
U.S. auto industry comprises all of the automobile-producing activity 
that occurs in the United States without regard to where the corpora-
tions performing that activity are based. As described above, such a 
domestic industry is competitive if it attracts large amounts of capi-
tal.55 Taxation, then, can hinder the competitiveness of such an indus-
try by discouraging local investment. 
In order to understand how the corporate income tax discourages 
investment in U.S. automobile production, consider an automotive in-
vestment that will be made in either the United States or Europe, but 
- not in both places. The investment might be the plant where a new 
fuel-efficient automobile to be sold in Asia is produced. If the invest-
ment is made in the United States, whether by a U.S.- or a foreign-
based corporation, the United States collects corporate income tax on 
the income that arises in the United States.56 If, however, the invest-
ment takes place in Europe, the United States does not collect any 
corporate tax on that income. Instead, the European jurisdiction 
where the investment is made will collect any corporate tax on that 
income. Thus, if the U.S. corporate income tax rate exceeds the cor-
porate income tax rate in the alternative European jurisdiction, then 
the U.S. corporate income tax will reduce the return from making an 
investment in the United States relative to the return from making the 
same investment in Europe.57 That, in tum, will increase the mini-
54 The discussion in the text assumes that the tax residence of a corporation is fixed. In 
effect, residence is an historical artifact that it is not practical to change because of various 
rules and provisions, such as the U.S. anti-inversion provisions. See IRC § 7874; Reg. 
§ 1.7874-1; Temp. Reg.§ 1.7874-lT, -2T. The opposite pole from the position assumed in 
the text is to assume that a corporation can reside anywhere. If the choice of corporate 
residence is purely elective and has no consequences other than tax, then presumably all 
companies will choose the tax home associated with the lowest total tax cost. Competition 
among states, then, can be expected to push the residence state tax bite close to zero. An 
intermediate position is to assume that residence follows real world activity. In that case, 
small economic changes that result in a change in residence could have large tax conse-
quences. In other words, the tax costs and benefits of certain small changes can be large, 
which means that such changes can have large implicit tax costs or subsidies. 
55 See discussion in Part II. 
56 See IRC §§ 11, 882. 
57 More generally, the relevant tax rate is not just the corporate tax rate. The relevant 
rate is the incremental rate on the capital income that is collected when the investment 
occurs in the United States instead of Europe. 
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mum required rate of return ("hurdle rate") for such an investment in 
the United States relative to the hurdle rate for such an investment in 
Europe. Therefore, if the U.S. corporate income tax rate exceeds the 
European rate, then the U.S. corporate income tax will discourage in-
vestment in the United States in favor of investment in Europe.58 
Although the investment-dampening effect of the corporate income 
tax is easiest to see when the output is sold in a third jurisdiction, the 
same logic applies when the output is sold in one of the jurisdictions 
where the investment can be made. Longstanding income tax princi-
ples call for the division of total income into the income from produc-
tion and the income from sale.59 The income from sale typically arises 
in the importing jurisdiction, whereas the income from production 
typically arises where production occurs. Thus, a corporate income 
tax, by raising the hurdle rate for investment in the taxing jurisdiction, 
drives capital investment toward other jurisdictions.60 Hence, the sec-
ond way that the U.S. corporate income tax harms the competitive-
ness of U.S. industries is by discouraging investment in productive 
activities in the United States in favor of investment elsewhere.61 
In contrast with the ownership-based definition of the U.S. auto in-
dustry (where a worldwide corporate income tax harms competitive-
ness, but a territorial tax does not), under the location-based 
definition, both territorial and worldwide corporate income taxes 
harm competitiveness. That a territorial corporate income tax harms 
competitiveness is easiest to see when every jurisdiction has such a 
tax. In that case, the income is taxed-at least in part-where invest-
ment occurs. Higher tax rates lead to less investment. It is also easy 
to see that the investment-dampening effect of the corporate income 
58 Throughout this Article, I assume that tax rates are the same across industries so that 
all investments subject to a specific tax regime are taxed at the same rate. If tax rates differ 
across investments, the location of specific investments can be affected through the impact 
on input prices. 
59 Income is not apportioned among countries, but instead the income arising in each 
country is taxed first by that country. Other countries through which that income might 
pass have only a secondary right to tax that income. 
60 This principle has long been recognized in the international tax literature. See Rich-
man, note 6, at 8-9, 90-94; Musgrave, note 6, at 72-73. 
61 The corporate income tax is not the only tax that discourages domestic production. 
The individual income tax has the same effect so long as individuals and noncorporate 
entities (such as partnerships, LLCs, and S corporations) are engaged in capital-intensive 
productive activities that can move offshore. In such circumstances, the U.S. income tax 
will raise the hurdle rate on investments in the United States. That, in turn, will discourage 
investment in the United States, thereby driving such investment abroad. Thus, the detri-
mental effect of income taxation on production in the United States is broader than the 
corporate income tax. Moreover, the deleterious effects of the individual income tax on 
local production can be cured by global adoption of worldwide individual taxaxtion with 
unlimited FTCs. Absent such coordination, countries with high tax rates will be disadvan-
taged in the competition to attract investment. 
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tax does not arise when the entity is not separately taxed-that is to 
say, when the entity is a pass-through entity-and the investor is sub-
ject to worldwide taxation (with unlimited FTCs). In that case, all 
income is taxed at the level of the investor. Assuming that the inves-
tor is taxed at the samerate (at the margin) on all income, then the 
individual's tax liability is not sensitive to the location where income_ is 
earned, which in turn implies that taxation does not distort location. 
The location-distorting effects of the corporate income tax are 
harder to see, but generally persist, when corporate entities are taxed 
on a worldwide basis. As described above, if all jurisdictions provide 
an unlimited FTC, then all investors have an incentive to invest 
through entities located in the jurisdiction with the lowest corporate 
income tax rate.62 In such circumstances, the marginal corporate tax 
rate on any investment is independent of the location where the in-
vestment occurs. Instead, the marginal corporate tax rate on every 
corporate investment is the corporate tax rate assessed by the jurisdic-
tion where all corporations are based. In theory, such a tax system 
can be locationally neutral because the effective tax rate on all corpo-
rate investments is the same.63 
In practice, however, worldwide corporate taxation is very unlikely 
to lead to locational neutrality. No country is likely to emerge as the 
consensus choice for corporate tax home because no country would 
likely be willing to make the financial sacrifice that would be neces-
sary to ensure locational neutrality.64 A low-tax country that attracts 
foreign corporations would have to rebate the difference in taxes paid 
on investments "in jurisdictions with higher tax rates.65 The cost to any 
jurisdiction of such an open-ended policy could be immense. Instead, 
countries with worldwide tax systems tend to limit FTCs to taxes paid 
abroad and do not provide refunds. That limitation gives effect to 
local tax rate differences and distorts the location of investment. 
62 The discussion in the text assumes that all countries tax corporations and their inves-
tors separately and that all countries provide both corporations and investors with unlim-
ited FTCs. 
63 Corporate investments might not all be channeled through the jurisdiction with the 
lowest corporate income tax rate. Nontax issues, such as corporate governance practices, 
corporate law, and securities laws, can affect the decision where corporate parents are 
based. In that case, if all investors invest through corporations in the same jurisdiction, 
then locational neutrality will occur. If, however, parent corporations are located in more 
than one jurisdiction with different tax rates, then locational neutrality will not be 
achieved. 
64 In a traditional worldwide tax system, the country levies the same tax on domestic 
activity within the country and on the foreign source income of domestic residents. Flem-
ing et a!., note 45, at 35-36. 
65 Of course, low-tax countries looking to attract corporations have no incentive to pro-
vide such refunds. Typically, they employ territorial taxation. 
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It is also common, although the United States does not currently do 
this, to restrict the use of FfCs so that excess FfCs from high-tax 
countries cannot be used to offset taxes owed on the income earned in 
low-tax countries. (Moreover, the proponents of worldwide taxation 
generally favor a country-by-country limitation on the FfC.66) The 
use of such country-by-country FfC limitations gives greater effect to 
cross-border differences in tax rates, thereby undercutting locational 
neutrality. Under such circumstances, worldwide corporate income 
taxation would raise the tax rate on low-taxed income to the home 
country level, but it would not reduce the tax on any income taxed at a 
rate above the home country level. Thus, to the extent that corpora-
tions can choose their tax homes, the incentive to select low-tax juris-
dictions remains and so there will be little tax collected at home. As a 
result, local tax rates will be determinative: They will affect location 
and there will not be locational neutrality. 
Alternatively, assume that the choice of tax home is not elective, 
but closely follows the location of specific assets. In that case, the 
effective tax on locating those assets in a jurisdiction is not only the 
tax assessed on the income produced by those assets, but also includes 
any other income that is taxed in the home jurisdiction by virtue of 
locating those assets in that jurisdiction. Thus, local tax rates will af-
fect the location of investment and the tax system will not be location-
ally neutral. 
In sum, it is uncertain what, if anything, worldwide taxation at the 
corporate level does to promote locational neutrality. In contrast with 
worldwide taxation at the investor level, where the mechanism for 
achieving locational neutrality is clear (although the conditions are 
strict-including universal adoption of worldwide taxation with unlim-
ited FTCs and investors with fixed locations-and there can be a high 
cost to the residence jurisdiction of adopting such a tax system), with 
corporate taxation it is not clear what is the mechanism whereby 
worldwide taxation will help to achieve locational neutrality.67 Ex-
pressed more succinctly, the case for worldwide corporate taxation as 
a method of achieving locational neutrality is highly questionable and 
remains to be made. It cannot and should not be presumed from a 
simple analogy to taxation of the individual investor. 
As the discussion above suggests, the disadvantage that the U.S. au-
tomotive industry-defined as the production of automobiles within the 
United States-suffers as a result of the U.S. corporate income tax is 
66 See, e.g., Fleming et al., note 45, at 36. 
67 Moreover, in a few special cases where a mechanism is specified, the conditions re-
quired for that mechanism to achieve locational neutrality are likely to be very strict (even 
stricter than they are for individual taxation) and very unlikely to occur. 
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not a function of the scope of that tax-whether it is territorial or 
worldwide-but rather is a function of the U.S. corporate income tax 
rate relative to corporate income tax rates in other jurisdictions. It, 
thus, follows that the United States can unilaterally improve its com-
petitiveness by reducing its corporate income tax rate.68 The obvious 
cost of such a policy to the U.S. government is a loss in revenue.69 In 
light of the United States' current fiscal condition, the lost revenue 
would have to be replaced.7° 
It follows from the discussion in the last two Parts that it is possible 
for the corporate income tax to produce both types of harmful effects 
at the same time. A U.S. worldwide corporate income tax will operate 
as a toll charge on overseas corporate investments by U.S. MNCs, 
thereby disadvantaging U.S.-based MNCs relative to their foreign 
competitors. In addition, if the U.S. corporate income tax rate ex-
ceeds the rate in many other countries with which the United States 
competes for investment, then the high U.S. corporate income tax rate 
will also discourage corporate investment in the United States. Be-
cause the above is a reasonably accurate description of current corpo-
rate income tax practices in the United States and the rest of the 
world, there is good reason to believe that the U.S. corporate income 
tax discourages production both by U.S. firms and in the United 
States. 
68 The United States would enhance its competitiveness by reducing other taxes on cor-
porate income, such as the taxes on dividends and capital gains (from sales of shares). 
69 Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Simple, Fair and Competitive 
Tax Plan for the United States 121, 124 (2008); see also IRS, Gross Collections, by Type of 
Tax, Fiscal Years 1960-2009, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09db06co.xls (last visited Aug. 
25, 2010) (showing business income tax gross collections of $354 billion in fiscal year 2008 
and $225 billion in fiscal year 2009). 
70 There is another caveat for proponents of worldwide corporate taxation. As de-
scribed in the last Part, the United States can improve the competitiveness of U.S.-based 
MNCs without lowering its corporate income tax rate by unilaterally moving to a territorial 
tax system. Although the United States can unilaterally reduce the disadvantage to pro-
duction in the United States by reducing the U.S. corporate tax rate, it cannot reduce that 
disadvantage by moving closer to a worldwide tax system. The source of the disadvantage 
is not that the United States does not have a pure worldwide system tax, but is instead that 
other countries from which investment in the United States comes do not have pure world-
wide corporate income tax systems. Reducing the disadvantage to U.S. production without 
lowering U.S. tax rates (or raising foreign tax rates) requires other countries to move to-
wards worldwide taxation-and that is not likely to happen. Indeed, the trend is away 
from worldwide taxation to the hybrid system described earlier. See text accompanying 
notes 50-51. Moreover, the movement must be such that all corporations are taxed on a 
worldwide basis on all of their investments so that local tax rates are not binding. 
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V. A DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF How THE CoRPORATE 
INCOME TAX AFFECTS COMPETITIVENESS 
In the last two Parts, I described how the corporate income tax af-
fects competitiveness. I showed that the impact of the corporate in-
come tax on competitiveness and the mechanism through which the 
tax affects competitiveness depends upon how the domestic industry is 
defined. In this Part, I express the impact of the corporate income tax 
on competitiveness diagrammatically. 
An example and some notation will be helpful. Consider a simple 
world with only two jurisdictions-the European Union and the 
United States. Denote the before-tax rate of return by R and the U.S. 
corporate income tax rate by t.71 The EU jurisdiction is assumed not 
to have a corporate income tax. The subscripts EU and US denote 
whether an asset is located in the European Union or the United 
States and the same superscripts denote whether the asset is owned by 
an EU or U.S. corporation. 
FIGURE 2 
GRAPHICAL DEPICTION oF How CoRPORATE INCOME TAX 
HURTS COMPETITIVENESS 
EU located 3 D 4 
I Rus=Rw 
A i B C 
_________________ j ______ ---------------------------- Rus( 1-t)=REU 
U.S. located 
1 2 
U.S. owned EU owned 
71 In practice, one would want to use the effective marginal tax rate-the present value 
of additional taxes paid on an incremental dollar of income-and not the statutory tax rate. 
For a discussion of effective marginal tax rates, see Myron S. Scholes, Mark A. Wolfson, 
Merle Erickson, Edward L. Maydew & Terry Shevlin, Taxes and Business Strategy 186 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
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Let the vertical axis in Figure 2 represent where productive assets 
are most efficiently located. The bottom of Figure 2 represents those 
assets where the efficiency advantage from locating in the United 
States is greatest. At the top are those assets where the efficiency 
advantage from locating in the European Union is greatest. The hori-
zontal solid line represents the point where there is no efficiency gain 
from locating the asset in either the United States or the European 
Union.72 Accordingly, if there are no distortions affecting the location 
of assets, then all assets above the horizontal solid line are located in 
the European Union and all assets below that line are located in the 
United States. 
Let the horizontal axis represent who most productively owns vari-
ous assets. On the far left are those assets for which the productivity 
advantage from U.S. ownership is greatest. On the far right are those 
assets for which the productivity advantage from EU ownership is 
greatest. The solid vertical line represents those assets for which U.S. 
and EU ownership are equally productiveJ3 Accordingly, if there are 
no distortions affecting the ownership of assets, then all assets to the 
right of the solid vertical line are EU-owned and all assets to the left 
of that line are U.S.-owned. 
Figure 2, thus, contains four quadrants, labeled 1 through 4, where 
each quadrant represents a different combination of efficient location 
and ownership. The bottom left quadrant (quadrant 1) contains assets 
that are efficiently located in the United States and U.S.-owned.74 
The bottom right quadrant (quadrant 2) contains assets that are effi-
ciently located in the United States and EU-owned.75 The top left 
quadrant (quadrant 3) contains assets that are efficiently located in 
the European Union and U.S.-owned.76 Finally, the top right quad-
rant (quadrant 4) contains assets that are efficiently located in the Eu-
ropean Union and EU-owned.77 If taxation does not distort the 
location and ownership of assets, then all productive assets will be lo-
cated where they are most efficiently located and owned by their most 
efficient owner.78 
12 That is to say, Rus = Rw. Below that line, Rus > Rw, and above that line, Rus < REv· 
73 Thus, at the line, Rus = Rw. To the left of that line, Rus > Rw, and to the right of that 
line, Rus < Rw. 
74 In the bottom left quadrant, Rusus > Rwus, Rusw, REuEV· 
75 In the bottom right quadrant, REV us> Ru5us, Rus £u, REV EU· 
76 In the top left quadrant, Ru5w > Rwus, Rusus, REuw. 
77 In the top right quadrant, REV Eu > Rw us, Rus w, Rus us· 
78 The analysis and discussion in the text do not distinguish among different owners 
from the same country. In other words, it is implicitly assumed that all potential owners 
from any country are taxed the same. If different owners are taxed at different rates, then 
the analysis is more complicated and the distortions are likely to be even greater. 
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Figure 2 also can be used to illustrate the two different definitions 
of the U.S. automobile industry. Under an ownership-based defini-
tion, the U.S. auto industry is the total production of U.S.-based man-
ufacturers. In Figure 2, this definition is represented by quadrants 1 
and 3. Similarly, the ownership-based EU automobile industry is rep-
resented by quadrants 2 and 4. Under a location-based definition, the 
U.S. auto industry is the production of automobiles in the United 
States by both U.S.-based and foreign-based auto producers. This 
definition is represented in Figure 2 by quadrants 1 and 2. Similarly, 
the location-based EU auto industry is represented by quadrants 3 
and 4. 
Figure 2, then, can be used to describe how the U.S. corporate in-
come tax affects U.S. competitiveness. As described in the text above, 
the tax will raise the before-tax rate of return in the United States 
relative to that in the European Union. That effect is represented by 
the horizontal dashed line that lies below the horizontal solid line. 
Accordingly, the assets represented by the area between the two hori-
zontal lines are the assets most efficiently located in the United States, 
but which as a result of the United States imposing a corporate in-
come tax are located in the European Union. Those assets are indi-
cated by the area marked by the letters A, B, and C. 
Furthermor~, the size of the area labeled A, B, and C depends upon 
the U.S. corporate income tax rate.79 The higher the U.S. tax rate, the 
larger is the area labeled A, B, and C. As the U.S. tax rate decreases, 
this area gets smaller. When the EU and U.S. tax rates are equal, then 
taxation has not dislocated any investments. If, however, U.S. tax 
rates are below EU tax rates, then the dashed line is above the solid 
line and taxation shifts assets from the European Union to the United 
States. As the discussion above makes clear, location depends upon 
relative tax rates. If tax rates are the same across locations, then taxes 
do not affect location. If they differ, then taxation encourages invest-
79 Because investors keep only their after-tax return, equilibrium requires that the after-
tax rate of return on assets in the United States and in the European Union is equal. If 
that condition is violated, then investors will shift capital from one jurisdiction to another 
until the after-tax rate of return is equal across jurisdictions. Assuming that the United 
States does not tax the EU income of U.S.-based MNCs, the after-tax rate of return of 
corporate capital in the United States equals the before-tax rate of return in the European 
Union. That is to say, in equilibrium, RusU - t) = REu· Thus, assets that are more produc-
tive in the United States than in the European Union, but are not sufficiently more produc-
tive in the United States to cover the U.S. tax (that is to say, REul(l - t) > Rus > REu), will 
migrate from the United States to the European Union. The higher the U.S. corporate 
income tax rate, the greater the migration. 
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ment in low-tax jurisdictions and discourages it in high-tax 
jurisdictions. 80 
As described in the text above, one effect of the United States en-
acting a corporate income tax, assuming that the tax is assessed on a 
worldwide basis, is to impose a toll charge on U.S. companies that 
invest abroad.81 In the example, the toll charge will raise the hurdle 
rate for investments by U.S. corporations in the European Union. 
That, in turn, will bring about a shift from U.S. to EU ownership of 
those investments where the productivity advantage from U.S. owner-
ship is insufficient to compensate for the higher hurdle rate brought 
about by the corporate income tax.s2 
That effect is illustrated in Figure 2 by the vertical dashed line, 
which only goes down as far as the horizontal dashed line. The verti-
cal dashed line, which indicates changes in ownership, does not extend 
below the horizontal dashed line because the toll charge only impacts 
investments by U.S. corporations abroad. It does not affect the do-
mestic investments of U.S. corporations. Thus, those assets repre-
sented by the area above the horizontal dashed line and to the right of 
the vertical dashed line are located in the European Union and EU-
owned. Assets above the horizontal dashed line and to the left of the 
vertical dashed line are assets located in the European Union and 
U.S.-owned. Accordingly, the assets for which ownership is shifted 
are those assets represented by the area between the two vertical 
lines. Those assets are indicated by the area marked by the letters B 
and D. 
Analogously to the situation with location, the size of the area la-
beled B and D depends upon the U.S. corporate income tax rate. 
That can be seen as follows. Equilibrium requires that the after-tax 
rate of return on U.S.-owned and EU-owned assets is equal at the 
margin. For assets located in the European Union that implies that at 
the margin the after-tax rate of return on capital owned by a U.S.-
based MNC equals the before-tax rate of return on capital owned by 
80 So long as the United States is a small country in the world capital market, the distri-
bution of assets between the United States and the European Union does not depend on 
whether the United States has a territorial or worldwide tax system. That is to say, if the 
United States is a price taker in global markets, then market rates of return do not depend 
on whether the United States taxes or exempts its residents on their overseas income. In 
terms of Figure 2, that implies that REU and Rus are independent of whether the United 
States taxes or exempts its residents on their non-U.S. income. It thus follows that so long 
as the United States is a price taker in global capital markets, that the location of assets 
does not depend on whether the United States adopts territorial or worldwide taxation. 
81 See discussion in Part III. 
82 Tightening worldwide taxation (for example, by reducing the opportunity for defer-
ral) discourages U.S. corporations from holding overseas assets by raising the toll charge 
on investments through U.S. companies. See Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness, note 11, 
at 34-36. 
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an EU-based corporation.83 Thus, the adoption by the United States 
of a corporate income tax will cause assets located in the European 
Union that are more productive in U.S. hands than in EU hands (but 
are not sufficiently more productive in U.S. hands to cover the tax84) 
to migrate from U.S. to EU ownership. Once again, the higher the 
U.S. tax rate, the greater the migration. 
That migration can be stopped Without reducing the statutory U.S. 
corporate income tax by the United States unilaterally moving from 
worldwide taxation to territorial taxation. If the United States were 
to adopt territorial taxation, then EU-based and U.S.-based firms 
would pay the same tax (assumed to be zero in the example) when 
they invested in the European Union. There would be, then, no toll 
l charge on overseas corporate investment. In terms of Figure 2, when 
1 
the U.S. corporate income tax rate on overseas investment is zero (t = 
0), then the dashed vertical line separating U.S.- and EU-owned as-
11 
sets (Ru5(1 - t) = Rw) sits exactly on top of the solid dotted line sepa-
rating efficiently U.S.- and EU-owned assets (Rus = REu). 
As described above, the current tax environment can be character-
! ized as follows: The United States has a relatively high corporate in-
·.1 come tax rate and the United States has a worldwide tax system for its 
MNCs. Thus, the harm to U.S. competitiveness from the corporate 
1 income tax is represented by the areas labeled A, B, C, and D. The 
I assets represented by those areas have had their location (A and C), 
ownership (B) or both their location and ownership (D) shifted away 
from the United States by the U.S. corporate income tax. 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
Politicians, the press, and policy analysts regularly assert that high 
corporate tax rates hurt U.S. competitiveness. Yet, in spite of their 
frequent assertions that the corporate income tax hurts competitive-
ness, the connection between the corporate income tax and competi-
, tiveness has not been carefully spelled out. In this Article, I use the 
U.S. automobile industry as an example in order to explore that 
connection. 
As described above, the corporate income tax directly harms the 
competitiveness of the U.S. auto industry in one of two ways depend-
ing upon how the domestic auto industry is defined.85 First, when the 
, U.S. auto industry is defined in terms of the production of automo-
83 That is to say, Ru5Eu (1- t) = Rww· 
84 That is to say, RwEu (1 - t) > Ru5w > RwEU· 
85 The corporate income tax can also have indirect effects on U.S. competitiveness. The 
analysis of such effects usually will entail a detailed analysis of the affected industry, in-
cluding its use of specific tax provisions. In this Article, I look only at direct effects. 
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biles that occurs within U.S. borders (without regard to where the cor-
porations producing those cars are based), the corporate income tax, 
by increasing the tax burden on U.S. source income raises the hurdle 
rate on domestic investment. The higher hurdle nite discourages in-
vestment in the United States in favor of investment abroad. Second, 
when each nation's auto industry is defined by the global production 
of auto producers based in that nation (without regard to where pro-
duction occurs), a worldwide corporate income tax operates as a toll 
charge on a firm's foreign income-producing activities undertaken 
abroad. Such a toll charge raises the hurdle rate on foreign direct 
investment, which in turn discourages investment through the affected 
corporation relative to investments made through untaxed or lower-
taxed corporations from other countries. When excess credits from 
income earned in one country can be used to offset excess income 
earned in another, the toll charge can be a subsidy for some 
investments. 
Although most of the discussion and analysis in this Article focuses 
on the impact of the corporate income tax on the U.S. automobile 
industry, the methodology and the results are not confined to a single 
industry or state or even to a single tax. There are several tax reform 
proposals that their proponents advocate, at least in part, on the 
grounds that they will improve U.S. competitiveness.86 The frame-
work developed in this Article for analyzing how the corporate in-
come tax affects competitiveness can be applied to examine the 
impact other existing taxes have and various tax reform proposals 
would have on competitiveness. As this Article makes clear, although 
it is a point that is often overlooked, how a tax affects the competitive-
ness of a domestic industry depends on whether the domestic industry 
is defined as the production that takes place within a state regardless · 
of where the producers are based or as the total production of domes-
tic-based producers both at home and abroad. The effects will often 
differ and so it is important to be clear about how the domestic indus-
try is defined. 
When the debate over tax reform and tax rates heats up-and it 
soon will-central issues in that debate will be what should happen to 
the corporate income tax, how should the overseas income of U.S. 
86 Among the most prominent of these proposals are: Graetz, note 68; Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment for Cor-
porate Income Taxation: The Hamilton Project (Univ. of Michigan Law & Econ., Olin 
Working Paper No. 07-009, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995202); Edward D. 
Kleinbard, Designing an Income Tax on Capital, in Taxing Capital Income 165 (Henry J. 
Aaron, Leonard Burman & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2007); The Presidential Advisory 
Panel on Tax Reform, Final Report (Nov. 2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ 
taxreformpanellfinal-report/index.html. 
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corporations be taxed, and what tax rates need to be increased in or-
der to raise revenue. A better understanding of the connections be-
tween taxes and competitiveness should raise the level of that debate 
and that might even lead to a better tax system. 
